Socorro County · public records project
See the cameras.
Read the records.
Take action.
An evidence-first public resource documenting surveillance technology, explaining how it works, and organizing lawful action to remove systems the public does not consent to.
Based on the county records package sent September 1, 2026 · reviewed September 7, 2026
01 · What the records establish
Known from the package
A county system with cameras, users, sharing, and a cloud platform.
The county produced a deployment tracker, user-account exports, shared-network data, a policy, contracts, invoices, a purchase order, and related documents. Together they establish a seven-camera license-plate-reader deployment at six mapped locations.
They do not establish who searched what, which plate records were accessed, whether a case number or reason was required, precisely which outside networks could see Socorro data, or whether each listed device is currently online.
Documented
Deployment and cost
Seven LPR cameras, six compute boxes, six locations, a signed 24-month order, and two invoices totaling $48,518.37 including tax.
Documented
Access and sharing lists
Twelve active accounts appear in the user exports. The network-sharing spreadsheet contains 379 rows, but cells may name multiple networks.
Not produced
Search and audit history
No Organization Audit or Network Audit export was included—the records most likely to show actual searches, access, and sharing events.
Still ambiguous
Current operation
The tracker says “INSTALLED.” No uptime, health, deactivation, or current-transmission report was included.
02 · Deployment map
Six recorded locations
Where the county placed the system.
Markers are plotted from coordinates in the county CSV. Select a marker or a location below for equipment details.
Markers use coordinates from the county CSV. Select a marker or location card for details. Basemap © OpenStreetMap contributors.
How to read the count
Each unique coordinate is treated as one location. Five locations pair one camera with one compute box. NM 304 at Wheeler Road pairs two cameras—one northbound and one southbound—with one compute box. That produces seven cameras, six compute boxes, thirteen equipment rows, and six locations.
03 · Public records room
September 1 production
What arrived—and what did not.
The records produced on September 1 are available below. Original files are posted where publication-safe; narrowly redacted public copies are clearly labeled.
Publication review complete
Vendor bank-account and routing information, internal user and role IDs, employee email addresses and phone fields, and signature images were removed from the affected public copies. Names, titles, roles, permissions, dates, prices, contract terms, locations, and other substantive records remain.
Deployment tracker
Thirteen installed equipment rows: seven LPR cameras and six compute boxes at six coordinate locations.
nm-socorro-county-so-deployment-tracker-08-31-2026.csvSigned order and agreement
Signed April 29, 2025; 24-month initial term, 24-month renewal language, 30-day retention, and $46,675 pre-tax.
Public copy removes payment-account details and signature images while preserving printed names, dates, and terms.State contract
The state contract supplied with the county production, including contract terms, specifications, forms, and appendices.
State Contract Flock.pdf · original file as producedApril 2025 quote
The nonbinding quote lists five standard LPR units and two solar LPR units, supporting a total of seven cameras.
Flcok Qoute.pdf · original filename contains spelling errorsUser-account exports
Twelve active accounts listed: two Admin and ten Patrol. Seven entries have a blank last-login field.
Public copies remove User ID, email, phone, and role ID fields. Names, roles, status, permissions, and last-login fields remain.Shared-network data
379 spreadsheet rows; 218 have “shared with me” content and 216 have “I’m sharing” content. Fifty-five contain both.
A cell may contain multiple names; row counts are not distinct-agency counts.Invoices and purchase order
2025 invoice: $24,531.92. 2026 invoice: $23,986.45. Combined: $48,518.37 including tax.
Public copies remove vendor bank-account and routing/SWIFT details. The county scan includes the 2026 purchase order.Policy 423
The policy is labeled September 16, 2025, after the earliest compute-box completion date listed as July 11, 2025.
The adoption or effective date is not clear from the label alone.Organization Audit
Needed to evaluate user searches, access events, reasons, case numbers, and policy compliance.
Priority follow-up request.Network Audit
Needed to evaluate actual inter-agency access and sharing events—not just the names appearing in a configuration export.
Priority follow-up request.Current system configuration
No current export proving retention, search-reason requirements, case-number rules, or the precise scope of state, national, or federal sharing.
Ask for native exports and field definitions.Records position
The request should not be treated as fully satisfied.
The package answers important questions about procurement and system footprint, but it does not include the audit exports needed to test actual use. It also leaves unresolved terms, dates, configuration meanings, and current operating status.
04 · Learn the systems
Surveillance field guide
Know what you are looking at.
This project tracks any public surveillance technology—not only one vendor or one camera type. “Documented here” means documented in the September 1 package, not that other systems do not exist.
Documented in this package
Automated license plate readers (ALPR/LPR)
Roadside cameras capture passing vehicles and create searchable records typically associated with a plate reading, image, time, and location. A system can reveal patterns of movement even when it does not identify a driver.
- Look for
- Small roadside camera, solar panel, cellular antenna, or vendor markings.
- Ask for
- Hit logs, search audits, hotlist sources, retention settings, sharing configuration, and device-health status.
Six documented in this package
What is a compute box?
A compute box is a local computer or controller installed as part of a camera system. It is not another camera or another location. It runs device software and may help process, temporarily hold, secure, and transmit camera data to the vendor’s cloud platform.
Socorro County’s tracker lists six compute boxes associated with seven LPR cameras. The produced records do not identify the boxes’ models, specifications, storage capacity, software versions, or precise division of processing between the roadside equipment and the cloud.
Camera captures→Compute box handles device tasks→Cloud stores and serves records
That sequence is a general, best-supported explanation of the component’s role—not a complete technical specification of Socorro County’s units.
Not documented in this package
Fixed CCTV and pan-tilt-zoom cameras
Fixed cameras watch one view. PTZ cameras can rotate, tilt, and zoom, sometimes automatically. Features may include low-light imaging, object detection, face search, or live monitoring.
- Look for
- Dome housings, turret cameras, motorized units, network cabinets, or city-owned poles.
- Ask for
- Live-view permissions, analytics licenses, retention, facial-recognition settings, and access logs.
Not documented in this package
Trailers, drones, body cameras, and vehicle systems
Mobile systems change location or move with personnel. They can include surveillance trailers, drones, body-worn cameras, dash cameras, or vehicle-mounted readers.
- Look for
- Portable masts, towable solar units, marked or unmarked mounts, launch sites, and docking stations.
- Ask for
- Deployment logs, flight logs, activation rules, upload policies, evidence-system access, and vendor contracts.
Not documented in this package
Audio, facial recognition, and device sensors
Public surveillance may also use acoustic sensors, facial or object recognition, Wi-Fi/Bluetooth detection, traffic analytics, or other tools that do not resemble a conventional camera.
- Look for
- Microphone arrays, small radio enclosures, unusual antennas, or procurement language describing “analytics.”
- Ask for
- Data elements, match thresholds, watchlists, false-positive testing, retention, sharing, and audit trails.
Removal means the whole system
A camera can come down while supporting hardware remains.
A complete decommissioning record should account for every camera, compute box, solar panel, battery, power connection, communications device, cabinet, mount, and cloud account—and should confirm that access, sharing, and data retention have ended.
05 · Surveillance news
Stop Mass Surveillance
Follow the systems—and the resistance.
The curated X feed brings together reporting, research, vendor updates, and public opposition involving Flock, Axon, license-plate readers, facial recognition, and other surveillance systems.
Live from X
Stop Mass Surveillance
Read critically
Posts and linked articles belong to their authors. Appearance in the feed is not verification or endorsement. Claims about a device, agency, vendor, or incident should be checked against primary records before being added to this project’s evidence base.
06 · Take lawful action
A public decision deserves a public process
Document it. Question it. End it lawfully.
This project supports public-records work, testimony, policy advocacy, budget oversight, and lawful decommissioning. It does not support trespass, vandalism, obstruction, or interference with equipment.
- 01Suspend and deactivate
Place all seven documented cameras and associated system components offline while public review occurs.
- 02Preserve and release audits
Preserve and produce Organization Audit and Network Audit records, including searches, access, and sharing events.
- 03Disclose the configuration
Publish current retention, hotlist, alert, access, sharing, search-reason, and case-number settings with field definitions.
- 04Hold a public vote
Require an open, noticed decision on continued use, policy, cost, and community consent.
- 05Decommission transparently
Terminate or decline renewal, remove all field hardware, close cloud access, and publish itemized removal and deletion confirmation.
07 · Community evidence
Field reports, photos, and public updates
Build the public record carefully.
Photograph only from places you may lawfully be. Do not touch, block, open, disable, or approach equipment in a way that creates danger.
Record context
Note the road, nearest cross street, travel direction, date, time, and visible identifiers.
Capture safely
Use a wide photo for location context and a closer image only when it can be taken lawfully and safely.
Separate fact from inference
Describe what is visible. Label guesses, possible device types, and uncertain ownership as unconfirmed.
Protect people
Avoid publishing faces, private addresses, license plates, or other personal information unrelated to the public system.
08 · Methodology
Evidence rules
What we say should be traceable.
Recorded status is not independently verified status
“Installed,” “Complete,” and similar labels are attributed to the county’s files. A record status is not presented as proof that a device is online now.
Counts identify their unit
Equipment rows, cameras, compute boxes, coordinate locations, accounts, and sharing-spreadsheet rows are counted separately.
Missing IDs are treated as questions
The apparent gaps F#003, P#003, and P#005 may reflect numbering conventions, removed equipment, or records outside the export. They are not proof of concealed devices.
Corrections stay visible
When better records change a count or conclusion, the corrected language and the reason for the correction should be published.